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The Challenge of Transsexuality:
Legal Responses to an Assertion
of Rights
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many rights enjoyed by Americans' have been accorded to them,
through federal and state constitutions, by virtue of their status as
citizens. 2 Historically, however, these rights were not accorded to all
citizens. 3 Constitutional and statutory action by legislatures has been
required in order to extend the rights of citizenship to certain citizens
previously excluded because of membership in identifiable classes.'
1. The nature and content of civil rights as well as the procedure for ascertaining which rights will be accorded recognition as civil rights have been the focus
of controversy in American law. Some of the more notable theories addressing these
two issues are: a) the "concept of ordered liberty"; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 n.14, & 155 (1968);
b) the doctrine of "total incorporation" (the argument that all of the rights catalogued
in the Bill of Rights-the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution-are
civil rights, but no others; see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (Murphy
and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting)); c) the doctrine of "selective incorporation" (the argument that only certain of the rights constituting the Bill of Rights are civil rights);
d) the "incorporation-plus" position (the argument that civil rights may include most,
or perhaps all, of those noted in the Bill of Rights but also encompass other rights
which are enunciated as circumstances necessitate); see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. at 124 (Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). With respect to "b", "c", and

"d" respectively, see generally L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§

11-2,

11-3 (1978).
2. The federal Constitution did not define the status of citizen, for either federal
or state purposes, until passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. The fourteenth amendment states, in this regard, "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Blacks, females, and American Indians are, perhaps, the most obvious
examples of status-based categories of persons initially denied civil rights despite fulfilling the definition of citizenship promulgated by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
4. With respect to Black Americans, three amendments to the federal Constitution were necessary to establish their civil rights. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,
XIV, XV. This constitutional effort has been supplemented by congressional legislative
action. See, e.g., the post-Civil War Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 (1976)
& § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980). See infra note 79 for the text of these sections; see also
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) as amended
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
See infra note 19 for text of the section of the Act pertinent to the equal employ-
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This special extension of rights is indicative of legislative recognition

that certain characteristics or conditions constitute minority statuses

with respect to civil and legal rights. It is indicative, too, of a recognition that these statuses have been grounds for the denial of rights

otherwise routinely enjoyed by the majority of the citizenry.
The fact that legislatures have acted to ensure that members of
certain minorities are able to enjoy rights previously denied has not
been lost on those classes of persons composing America's contemporary minorities, such as the aged, physically and mentally handi-

capped, and homosexuals. Extensive lobbying on behalf of each of

these classes has had varying success in securing legislative creation
and protection of their civil and legal rights.' Nonetheless, the fact
ment opportunity claims being asserted by pre- and post-operative transsexuals.
With respect to women, see the nineteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIX, extending the right to vote to women and the aborted twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution, popularly known as the "Equal Rights Amendment." (§ 1
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.") See I U.S.C. at LVII (1976) for the
entire text of the proposed amendment. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (extension of.
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to females).
5. At the level of congressional legislative action, see generally 42 U.S.C. § 6012
(a) (requiring the protection of and advocacy for the rights of the developmentally
disabled); 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age in federally
financed programs).
At the level of state legislative action, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
1982 & Supp. 1983). "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges,
or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." By judicial action,
the foregoing section has been extended to homosexuals with respect to access to
rental housing and with respect to securing their right of free association. Id.; COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 24-34-402, -502, -601, -701 (1973) (prohibiting, respectively, discrimination
in employment, housing, public accommodations, and publication of discriminatory
advertising with respect to handicap, race, creed, color, sex, marital status, national
origin, and ancestry); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West Supp. 1983) (prohibiting deprivation of rights on the basis of religion, national origin, alienage, color, race, sex, blindness, and physical disability); id. at §§ 46a-60, -64 (prohibiting,
respectively, discrimination in employment and public accommodations on the basis
of race, color, creed, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, mental retardation, physical
disability, and present or past mental disorders; only § 46a-60 extends coverage to
present or past mental disorders); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 102A (1981) (prohibiting
discrimination with respect to employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit and public accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, and unfavorable discharge from the military).
The following provision of the Iowa Civil Rights Act is of particular importance to this comment. See infra text Part IIB accompanying notes 53-78.
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that representatives of these classes have turned to federal and state
legislatures suggests that minorities, regardless of their salience, are
finding this route particularly effective in their efforts to secure civil
and legal rights. This appears to be the case with transsexuals.,
Transsexuals constitute a numerically small minority. In 1976,
it was estimated that there were 20,000 pre- and post-operative transsexuals in the United States. 7 And, while the number of post-operative
transsexuals is not known, an estimated 1,5008 sex-reassignment
It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:
a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of
the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion or disability of such
applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation. If
a disabled person is qualified to perform a particular occupation, by reason
of training or experience, the nature of that occupation shall not be the
basis for exception to the unfair or discriminating practices prohibited by
this subsection.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(l)(a) (West 1975).
6. The civil and legal rights of transsexuals may vary depending upon the
further categorization of transsexuals as pre- and post-operative. Because of this,
a clear distinction between pre- and post-operative transsexuals will facilitate the
reader's understanding of the issues to be examined in this comment. Accordingly,
the following definitions are to be kept in mind whenever this distinction is drawn
in the text.
A pre-operative transsexual is defined as an individual who is chromosomally
and anatomically a member of one sex but who neither accepts the sex-status so
entailed nor identifies with the applicable psychological sex-role. See Money, Sex

Reassignment as Related to Hermaphroditism and Transsexualism in

TRANSSEXUALISM

REASSIGNMENT 91, 111-13 (1969) [hereinafter cited as TRANSSEXUALISM]. It
is to be noted that a pre-operative transsexual may live as a member of his (or her)
chromosomal, anatomical sex or as a member of his (or her) psychological sex.
A post-operative transsexual, as this phrase is used herein, is defined as a
transsexual, chromosomally and anatomically male or female, who, through surgery,
has achieved congruence between his (or her) psychological sex-identification and
his (or her) anatomical sex.
Transsexualism, as just defined, is distinguishable from transsexualism
associated with hermaphroditism-a condition in which an individual has sex
characteristics of both sexes due to chromosomal errors. This comment deals only
with transsexualism as a psychological phenomenon found among chromosomally
and anatomically normal individuals. Id. at 111-12.
7. Comment, M.T. v. J.T.: An Enlightened Perspective on Transsexualism,
6 CAP. U. L. REV. 403, 410 (1977).
8. J. GAGNON & B. HENDERSON, HUMAN SEXUALITY: AN AGE OF AMBIGUITY
(1975).
Only post-operative transsexuals can be counted with any accuracy. This is
so because certain objective factors, noted below, define this status. It then becomes
a matter of locating and counting all those persons manifesting these objective factors.
AND SEX
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surgeries9 are performed annually in the United States. Perhaps reflecThe first factor is that of having undergone sex-reassignment surgery. See infra note 9. Data in this regard can be obtained from those physicians and hospitals
performing sex-reassignments surgeries.
The second factor is the legal action instituted to petition a court for a change
of name to reflect the change of sex the petitioner has secured through sex-reassignment
surgery. Since name changes are concomitant with sex-reassignment surgery, court
records can be examined in order to determine the number of such changes granted
because of surgical change of sex.
Determining the number of pre-operative transsexuals is more difficult. For
those who are involved in the process preparatory to sex-reassignment surgery (see
infra note 9), an accurate census can be obtained, once again, by a survey of physicians and hospitals performing sex-reassignment surgery. But, for transsexuals who
have neither undergone sex-reassignment surgery nor are in the process of preparing
for such surgery, an accurate estimate may be impossible.
These pre-operative transsexuals are hidden. Their status as transsexuals is
a function of their psychological belief that they are members of the opposite
chromosomal, anatomical sex. No objective indicators are available to corroborate
this belief and permit categorization of these individuals as transsexuals. In fact,
the principal objective evidence in this regard probably would be the adoption of
dress and grooming characteristic of the person's psychological sex and, therefore,
inapposite to his (or her) chromosomal, anatomical sex. However, this cross-dressing
and cross-grooming usually does not occur unless the transsexual is preparing for
sex-reassignment surgery in which case the person would be counted, as noted above,
as a transitional transsexual-a transsexual who, while presently pre-operative, is on
the threshold of being a post-operative transsexual.
The essentially subjective nature of transsexuality (the psychological belief that
one belongs to the opposite sex and the personal identification with and commitment to the psychosocial prescribed role definitive of the opposite sex) absent preparation for or completion of sex-reassignment surgery means that an accurate enumeration of the entire category of transsexuals is impossible. The ease with which preoperative transsexuals can remain anonymous renders speculative any estimate of
the total number of transsexuals.
Transsexuality and transvestism are not synonymous conditions or statuses.
Transsexuality is, behaviorally,
the act of living and passing in the role of the opposite sex, before or after
having attained a hormonal, surgical, and legal sex reassignment; psychically, it is the condition of people who have a conviction that they belong
to the opposite sex and are driven by a compulsion to have the body, appearance, and social status of the opposite sex.
[Transvestism is) behaviorally, . . . the act of dressing in the clothes of
the opposite sex; psychically, it is the condition of feeling compelled to crossdress, often in relation to sexual arousal and attainment of orgasm.
Glossary, TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, at 487.
9. Sex-reassignment surgery is one aspect-the final and, perhaps, most
dramatic aspect-of the rather lengthy and complex process of sex-reassignment. The
process begins with a thorough psychiatric and psychosocial evaluation of the candidate. Money & Schwartz, Public Opinion and Social Issues in Transsexualism: A
Case Study in Medical Sociology in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 253, 268-69. Those
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tive of their apparently growing statistical presence, transsexuals have
begun attempting to secure certain of their civil and legal rights through
suits seeking the coverage of various civil rights statutes-particularly
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
transsexuals accepted for sex-reassignment surgery undergo hormonal treatment to
suppress existing anatomical sex-characteristics and to develop and maintain the
anatomical sex-characteristics of the post-operative opposite sex. Hamburger, Endocrine Treatment of Male and Female Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra
note 6, 291, 291. During this phase of hormonal treatment, sex-reassignment patients
are expected to live as members of their post-operative opposite sex. See, e.g., Jones,
Operative Treatment of the Male Transsexual, in TRA SSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 313,
313. This means dressing and grooming as do members of the opposite sex. It also
means adopting the prescribed sex-role of the opposite sex. Particularly important
is the effort, during this period of cross-sex living, to determine whether or not the
patient will be successful in finding and holding a job. Green, Psychiatric Management of Special Problems in Transsexualism, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 281,
285. Indeed, as will become clear in Part II of this comment, see infra text and
accompanying notes 18-92, one of the most significant legal problems of transsexuals
occurs in relation to employment during this pre-operative preparatory phase of crosssex living. It is at this time that the psychological-often, hidden-transsexual becomes
publicly identified as such by virtue of this cross-sex living. This is the first significant opportunity-perhaps, the first such opportunity-for discrimination. And, when
discrimination occurs, it is typically in an employment setting. This likelihood of
employment discrimination may be a function of the public, open nature of the
employment setting as distinguished from the privacy of the home and of familial
and other personal relationships.
The next step in the process of sex-reassignment is the sex-reassignment surgery
itself. For the male-to-female transsexual, surgery consists of amputation of the penis
and testes and the construction of female external genitalia and a vagina from the
excised penile and testicular tissue. Jones, supra, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6,
at 314-16. For the female-to-male transsexual, the surgery is more complicated and
dramatic. Both breasts are removed. A hysterectomy, including removal of both
ovaries, is performed. Male external genitalia are constructed. This consists of constructing both the penis and testes as well as constructing a functional urethra. Hoopes,
Operative Treatment of the Female Transsexual, in TRANSSEXUAUSM, supra note 6,
335, 338-45.
Male-to-female transsexuals are able to engage in sexual intercourse. Jones,
supra, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, at 316. Female-to-male transsexuals are not
able to perform sexually since penile erection cannot be attained. Hoopes, supra,
in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, at 343.
Extensive post-operative treatment is necessary. Initially, such treatment focuses
on recovery from the surgery itself. It also includes continuation of hormonal therapy.
Wollman, Office Management of the Postoperative Male Transsexual, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 331, 332. Psychosocially, the patient receives education and
practice in living as a member of the post-operative opposite sex. In addition, therapy
or counselling is utilized to manage any problems encountered in day-to-day living
as a "new" member of the opposite sex. Migeon, Therapy for the Control of
Postcastration Symptoms, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 353, 354.
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Opportunity Act of 1972,10 the post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts,"
and state statutory equivalents to federal civil rights and equal
employment opportunity statutes.' 2 Following this strategy has meant
requesting the courts, both federal and state, to render statutory constructions inclusive of pre- and post-operative transsexuality. In addition to suits predicated on statutory grounds, transsexuals have asked
the courts to establish fifth and fourteenth amendment grounds for
their civil and legal rights. 3
The principal focus of this comment will be the responses of
federal and state courts to the litigative attempts of pre- and postoperative transsexuals to establish rights with respect to their most
immediate concerns: negotiating the issues of daily life.' 4 Accordingly,
attention will be focused on the efforts of transsexuals to establish
job security through inclusion within federal and state equal employment opportunity acts." Attention will be given as well to an
examination of a developing judicial consensus establishing the right
of indigent transsexuals to federally funded sex-reassignment surgery."
In addition, this comment will consider the impact of pre- and post10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). See infra note 19 for text of the applicable
subsections of this statute and accompanying textual material for a detailed review
of the claims based upon this statute which are advanced by transsexual plaintiffs.
11. See supra note 4; see also infra note 79 for the text of these statutes.
12. See supra note 5.
13. Fifth amendment claims are predicated on due process grounds. Fourteenth
amendment claims are predicated on due process or equal protection grounds. See
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. The central tasks of daily living-seeking and maintaining employment;
establishing and maintaining the familial bond between two adults; having and raising
children-are no less the tasks of transsexuals than they are the tasks of the nontranssexual majority. In this respect, the issues examined in this comment are issues
shared by most, if not all, Americans.
Only the issue of sex-reassignment surgery is specific to transsexuals. It is addressed because at least 1,500 pre-operative transsexuals annually (see supra text accompanying note 8) act on the belief that such surgery is preferable to their preoperative condition. Since sex-reassignment surgery appears to be a vital concern,
the ability to afford the surgery becomes an equally vital concern. The fact that
indigency, of itself, may not preclude surgery is of definite interest both to preoperative transsexuals seeking surgery and post-operative transsexuals who may be
able to secure reimbursement for an accomplished surgery. See infra text accompanying notes 93-116.
It is interesting to note in this regard that employed, nonindigent pre-operative
transsexuals covered under group medical coverage may be successful in bringing
claims against their carriers. Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 101 Misc.
2d 1, 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1979).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 18-92.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 93-116.
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operative transsexual status on the right to marry and on the rights
of previously married transsexual parents to child custody and

visitation. 7

II.
A.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

REMEDY SOUGHT UNDER TITLE VII

Several pre- and post-operative transsexuals have sought federal

statutory protection with respect to sex-based discrimination in
employment. 8 Such protection derives from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972.19

Pre- and post-operative transsexuals have sought such protection

on the theory that the term "sex," as used in the statutes, extends
beyond chromosomal and anatomical definitions of sex to include,

17. See infra text accompanying notes 117-44.
18. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1981) (raising claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 & 1985(3)); Sommers v. Budget
Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Sommers I] (raising a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 661, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
as well as under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Ulane
v. Eastern Airlines, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983) (raising two
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Md. 1977) (raising a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 570 F.2d
354 (9th Cir. 1978) (raising a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2); Grossman v.
Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., II Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,686 (D.N.J. 1975),
aff'd without published opinion, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Grossman I] (raising claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985(3) & 2000e-2, & 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), unfair labor practice, an issue which
will not be considered in this comment).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The text of the statutory provision most
frequently relied upon is as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
The italicized language was not included in the original act. The text of the applicable subsection of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be found at 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
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at least, an individual's cross-sex2 ° psychological identification. 2' Thus,
it is argued that Congress intended to protect individuals whose sex
might be established through psychological identification or surgical
20. Cross-sex psychological identification means that the individual has
adopted-emotively, perceptually, and cognitively-a sex-identity which is opposite
to the sex-identity typically associated with his or her chromosomal and anatomical sex.
21. This argument is necessary for two reasons. First, it is necessary to rebut
assertions by employers, as defendant-appellees, that Congress intended to extend
the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 only to sex as commonly understood in daily
parlance. See infra notes 27 & 40. If, in fact, this was the intent of Congress, transsexuals qua transsexuals would be foreclosed from coming within the term "sex."
Second, if this common meaning of sex is conceded by transsexual plaintiff-appellants,
pre-operative transsexuals would be precluded absolutely, by definition, from asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 based on the term "sex" as commonly
understood. Only post-operative transsexuals would have any chance of coming within
such a definition of the term "sex." Post-operative transsexuals, having already altered
their sex, could claim employment-related discrimination strictly on the basis of sex.
This is true particularly of male-to-female post-operative transsexuals who could assert
such discrimination on the basis of their status as females. See Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d
at 1048-49; Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. III. Dec. 28,
1983) (see Count I of the Title VII cause of action alleging discrimination on the
basis of being female).
This argument is far from prevailing at the present time as the cases in this
area make clear. See supra note 18 & infra note 40. But it has a plausibility which,
when combined with the "right" factual situation, enterprising counsel and a sympathetic court, might overcome the developing and, seemingly, firm stare decisis in
this area. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 (dicta in the majority opinion and Goodwin, J., dissenting); M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 85-90, 355 A.2d 204, 208-11
(1976). In fact, this unlikely combination of factors came together very recently in
Ulane, resulting in the first break with established precedent. Ulane, No. 81C-4411,
slip op. (N.D. IlI. Dec. 28, 1983); see infra note 29 for an overview of this case.
In this event, transsexual plaintiffs would face the problem which confronts all
claimants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2-establishing a prima facie case.
The United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), has established the elements of a prima facie case of employmentrelated discrimination and has allocated the respective burdens of proof. Thus, the
transsexual plaintiff would be required to establish: (a) his or her protected status
under the applicable statutes; (b) that he or she applied for work for which he or
she was qualified and for which the employer-defendant was seeking applicants; (c)
that, though qualified, he or she was rejected by the employer-defendant; and (d)
that the employer-defendant continued its search to fill the position for which the
transsexual plaintiff had applied.
The transsexual plaintiff's success in establishing the elements of a prima facie
case would shift the burden of proof to the employer-defendant, who would be required to come forth with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision. Id. at 802. If the employer-defendant were successful in this regard (as
might be the case if the employer-defendant argued context-of-employment, see infra note 47 and accompanying text) the burden of proof would return to the transsexual plaintiff who would be required to show that the nondiscriminatory reason
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intervention as well as by normal developmental processes. Congress
could do this most directly by focusing not on the manner of sexcategorization but rather on the resultant categorization itself. The
intent of Congress, it is argued, was to eliminate sex as an invidious
factor with respect to the allocation of employment and employment
opportunities regardless of how an individual's sex came to be
established. Therefore, continues the argument, Congress' choice of
the term "sex," without qualification, was deliberate. It was chosen
because it is inclusive enough to provide the desired protection to
all individuals regardless of sex and regardless of how their sex is
determined.22
The uniform response of employer-defendants has been the frank
admission of discrimination: discrimination based on transsexuality
per se;23 discrimination based on the transsexual plaintiff's stated
proffered by the employer-defendant for its employment decision is not legitimate
but pretextual-a cover-up for a discriminatory employment decisions. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
As an alternative to showing that the employment decision was pretextual and,
therefore, discriminatory, the transsexual plaintiff could follow a strategy which would
require assuming the burden of proving that a facially neutral employment decision
disproportionately impacts on him (or her) as a member of a protected class thereby
functioning to " 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). If successful, the
burden of proof would shift to the employer-defendant to show that the employment decision under challenge was justified by the nature of the employment situation.
The employer-defendant's burden would be carried where the employment decision is shown to have "a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
Id. at 432. Griggs permits the employer-defendant to utilize the context-of-employment
argument as a justification for discriminating against an otherwise protected category.
See infra note 47.
The Burdine Court indicated that the plaintiff in a Title VII action bears the
initial burden of proof in terms of the production of evidence. If the plaintiff successfully carries this burden, the burden of proof in terms of production of evidence
shifts to the defendant. 450 U.S. at 253-54. However, the Court pointed out that
only the plaintiff bears the burden of proof as the burden of persuasion. Id. at
253, 256. The defendant is not required to carry a burden of persuasion but, instead, is only required to produce evidence which raises an issue of fact regarding
whether or not it acted discriminatorily towards the plaintiff. Id. at 254.
22. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 749 (plaintiff arguing for expansion of the term
"sex" to encompass psychological sex, that is, the sex with which a person identifies); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63 (plaintiff arguing that Congress intended the
term "sex" to encompass gender or psychological sex-role identification).
23. Powell, 436 F. Supp. at 370; see also Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 28, 1983).
The employer-defendant in Ulane, Eastern Airlines, propounded essentially the
same arguments regarding the meaning of the term "sex" in Title VII as have the
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resolve to undergo sex-reassignment surgery;2 ' or discrimination based
on the alleged impact of transsexuality within the context of
employment. 25 In each case, employer-defendants have asserted that
the applicable statutes do not prohibit employment discrimination based
on transsexuality.
The argument of employer-defendants is predicated on the theory
that Congress intended that the term "sex" be given its plain
meaning.26 Specifically, they contend that Congress intended the term

"sex" to mean that chromosomal, anatomical, and psychological convergence which people in their ordinary lives designate as male and
female respectively. Employer-defendants argue that Congress did not

intend the term "sex" to apply where there is a disturbance in this
convergence. By implication, the argument continues, any cause of
action must allege and prove that the transsexual plaintiff was
discriminated against on the basis of sex as commonly understood.27
Employer-defendants claim that transsexual plaintiffs cannot make such
employer-defendants in all of the Title VII cases brought by pre- and post-operative
transsexuals. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Ulane,
No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983); see also infra, text accompanying
notes 26, 27. Thus, Eastern argued that Title VII does not extend to transsexuals
principally because Congress did not intend the term "sex" to extend beyond the
meaning encompassed by sex defined as a person's immutable sex-categorization made
at birth. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 3-4.
Eastern noted that those courts hearing the Title VII complaints of transsexuals had
refused to extend Title VII to them. Id. at 4-6. On this point, Eastern cited many

of the cases discussed in this comment: Holloway, Powell, Voyles, and Grossman
L Id.; see supra note 18 & infra note 40.

Eastern also argued that sex-reassignment surgery does not render the postoperative transsexual either a male or, in the case of Ulane, a female for the purposes of Title VII. Id. at 7-8. Therefore, according to Eastern, a claim of sex
discrimination qua sex discrimination could not be stated under Title VII. Again,
the defendant-employer asserted that the term "sex," as used in Title VII, extends
only to the sex with which a person is born. Eastern argued that the fact that a
person, through surgery, can change his (or her) birth-sex ipso facto is beyond the
scope of the term "sex" as used in Title VII and, hence, is beyond the scope of
its protection. Id. at 6-8.
24. Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 456.
25. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 748-49; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661; Ulane, No.
81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983); Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 456, 457 n.
3; In re Grossman, 157 N.J. Super. 165, 168-69, 384 A.2d 855, 856 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Grossman II1].

26. Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d at 1049; Sommers 1, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway, 566
F.2d at 662.
27. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 749; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664; Powell, 436 F.
Supp. at 371; Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457. Regarding congressional intent relative
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, employer-defendants appear to be correct. See infra notes
35-36, & 40.
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an allegation given their candid admissions of discrimination based
on the factual basis of transsexuality rather than on maleness or
femaleness.
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. (Sommers J),28 is the most
recently decided case adopting the reasoning advanced by

employer-defendants. 2 9 In Sommers I, a male-to-female pre-operative
transsexual was fired three days after securing a position with Budget
Marketing when it became known that, while being anatomically male,

she3" was representing herself as a female and using the restrooms
28. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
29. See supra note 18 & infra note 40; but see Ulane, No. 81C-441 1, slip op.
(N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983). This case, currently being appealed by the employer-defendant, Eastern Airlines, is a most significant though, at this point, minority development in the construction of the term "sex" as used in Title VII. Here, for the first
time, a federal court has held that, for the purpose of Title VII, the term "sex"
includes transsexuality. Hence, transsexuals qua transsexuals-rather than as pre- or
post-operative males or females-were held to be protected by Title VII against
employment discrimination.
It is important to note that the district court ruled for the plaintiff Ulane on
the more controversial of her two-count Title VII action. Ulane alleged in Count
I that she had been fired from her position as a pilot for Eastern Airlines because
of her sex-her post-operative sex as a female. In Count II, she alleged that she
was terminated because of her transsexuality. In view of the fact that there is some
judicial support for a finding favorable to a transsexual plaintiff on a claim of sexdiscrimination (see Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664, dicta in the majority opinion and
Goodwin, J., dissenting), the ruling of the district court in Ulane is indeed a major
departure from precedent. No court hearing employment discrimination claims under
Title VII advanced by transsexuals has held (or even hinted) that the protection of
the statute could be extended to transsexuals qua transsexuals.
The ultimate significance of Ulane remains to be established. However, the
impact of the decision could be far-reaching. If the ruling is upheld by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a dramatic conflict between three appellate circuits would exist with respect to a major element of Title VII jurisprudence: the
proper construction of the term "sex". Cf. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway,
566 F.2d at 663 (the Eighth and Ninth Circuit courts, respectively, holding that Congress did not intend the word "sex" in Title VII to encompass any meaning beyond
the term "sex" as normally understood); see also infra note 40. Appellate affirmation of Ulane would be directly contradictory.
Such a conflict ultimately may prompt resolution by. the Supreme Court because
of the centrality of sex to the coverage of Title VII. Ulane, if upheld, represents
a new cause of action under Title VII, conflicting directly with the holdings of other
lower federal courts and of both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Thus, should Eastern
lose on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court may grant review. For
reasons of consistency in the interpretation and application of the centerpiece of
employment discrimination legislation, the Court may determine that it must give
an authoritative delineation of Title VII's coverage with respect to sex.
30. It is to be noted that a male-to-female pre-operative transsexual is a
chromosomal, anatomical male whose psychological sex, that is, the sex with which
the individual identifies, is female. See supra note 6. A male-to-female post-operative
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designated for female employees. The Sommers court was presented
with the prototypical arguments regarding transsexuality in relation
to the statutory use of the term "sex": the plaintiff arguing that the
term "sex" should be extended beyond its common meaning; the
defendant arguing that the term should be limited to its common meaning. And, as have virtually all courts faced with this issue,3" the Sommers court adopted the argument of the employer-defendant holding
that Congress intended the term "sex" to be given its common meaning
and that the common meaning does not extend to cover problems
of sex related to psychological identification, 2 sexual preference,3 3 or
4
sexual pathologies such as transvestism.
The reasoning supporting the remarkable uniformity of decisions
continued by Sommers I is bolstered by Congress' apparent recognition that it did not intend" the term "sex," as used in Title VII of
transsexual is a transsexual who underwent the surgery necessary to establish congruence between psychological and anatomical sex. A female-to-male pre-operative
transsexual is a chromosomal, anatomical female whose psychological sex is male.
A female-to-male post-operative transsexual is a transsexual who, through surgery,
has established congruence between psychological and anatomical sex. In recognition
of the significance of psychological sex, which is precisely what precipitates the decision to undergo sex-reassignment surgery, the pronoun "she" is used by the courts
and in this comment to refer to both pre- and post-operative male-to-female transsexuals. See supra note 18 & infra note 40. Similarly, the pronoun "he" is used
in referring to pre- and post-operative female-to-male transsexuals.
Most pre-operative transsexuals are male-to-female. Most sex-reassignment
surgeries are male-to-female. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Female Transsexualism,
in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, 59, 60-61.
31. See supra note 18 & infra note 40; but see Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op.
(N.D. Il. Dec. 28, 1983); see supra note 29.
32. See supra note 18 & infra note 40.
33. Thus, it has been held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 does not encompass employment discrimination based on affectional or sexual preference, e.g., homosexuality
and bisexuality. See, e.g., Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. (The Kemper Group), 507 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
34. See Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d at 1050. The court interpreted the 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) complaint of a male-to-female pre-operative transsexual as being based
on the employer's refusal to allow plaintiff-appellant to dress as a female. In other
words, the court restated the complaint as an attempt to extend § 2000e-2(a) to include transvestism rather than as an attempt to extend it to encompass transsexuality.
35. It is to be noted that subsequent amendments offered to existing law may
indicate that the intent of Congress has changed since enactment. But, it is possible
that such proffered amendments merely indicate that Congress is dissatisfied with
the judicial construction either of the law itself or of the congressional intent upon
which the law was based.
One bill, H.R. 166, was introduced by Congresswoman Abzug on January 14,
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the Civil Rights Act and in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
to include affectional or sexual preference.1 6 As a consequence, in
1975, several bills were introduced in the House of Representatives
which were drafted to prohibit discrimination under section 2000e-2
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act based on "affectional or
sexual preference." 37 The text of these bills suggests rather strongly
that the sponsors of this amendatory legislation had become cognizant that the term "sex" in the original statutes was not intended
to cover the ambiguities raised by bisexuality, homosexuality, trans-

sexuality, and transvestism.38

1975. Its substance is as follows:
Civil Rights Amendments - Defines the term "affectional or sexual
preference" to mean for purposes of the Civil Rights Act having or
manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons of either gender, or having or manifesting a preference for
such attachment. Prohibits discrimination based upon such affectional or
sexual preference in the following areas: (1) public accommodations; (2)
public education; (3) equal employment opportunities; (4) the sale, rental
and financing of housing; and (5) education programs which receive Federal
financial assistance.
H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., paraphrasedin 1 DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS
AND RESOLUTIONS E-38 (1975).
Another bill, H.R. 2667, was introduced by Congressman Fraser on February
4, 1975. Its substance is as follows:
Prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, or affectional
or sexual preference in the following areas: (1) public accommodations; (2)
public facilities; (3) public education; (4) federally assisted programs; (5)
employment; (6) housing sales, rentals, financing, and brokerage services.
• . .Defines "affectional or sexual preference" as meaning an emotional

or physical attachment to another person or persons of either gender, or
an inclination for such an attachment.
H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., paraphrasedin I DIGEST OF PUBLIC GENERAL BILLS
AND

RESOLUTIONS E-304 (1975).

36. "Affectional or sexual preference" is a term expansive enough to encompass homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals (both pre- and post-operative), and
transvestites since it does not focus on the chromosomal, anatomical or psychological
sex of an individual nor on a particular variant of sexual experience or behavior.
Its breadth, therefore, permits coverage to extend beyond the limitation inherent in
a specific sex-object term which would be created, for example, if the single term
"homosexuality" were used.
It is to be noted that the term "affectional or sexual preference" is indicative
of the recognition that "sex" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 does not embrace individuals who are discriminated against on the basis of sexuality, sex-object choice,
or psychological sex-identification. Rather, the term "sex" in the statute protects
only those individuals who are discriminated against on the basis of sex understood
as the congruence of chromosomal, anatomical, and psychological factors.
37. See supra notes 35, 36.
38. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Federal courts, with the exception of Ulane,39 faced with prayers
that section 2000e-2 be extended beyond the convergent definition of
sex employed in day-to-day discourse, have refused to construe the
statute beyond what appears to be the manifest intent of Congress." °
Indeed, while courts have been cognizant of and sympathetic to the
employment discrimination experienced by transsexuals, they have taken
the firm position that it is Congress which must provide the relief
sought."' In the opinion of virtually all courts considering the employment discrimination claims of transsexuals, to do what Congress has
not done (and, apparently, has not intended to do) would be to function outside the judiciary's constitutional purview. 2
The narrow interpretation given to the term "sex" in claims of
employment discrimination brought by transsexuals is only the first
obstacle to be faced. With the single exception of Ulane, 3 it has proved
to be an insurmountable obstacle. But, assuming that a transsexual plaintiff prevailed on the argument that the term "sex" does
include both pre- and post-operative transsexuals, the plaintiff would
be faced by the context-of-employment argument pressed vigorously
by the employer-defendant.
The Grossman series of cases, Grossman v. Bernards Township
39. No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983); see supra note 29.
40. See, e.g., Sommers , 667 F.2d at 750 (affirming trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of employer-defendant: "Because Congress has not shown
an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one's
transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the Act."); Holloway,
566 F.2d at 663 (affirming trial court's grant of employer-defendant's motion to
dismiss: "Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term 'sex'
to its traditional meaning."); Grossman I, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,686
(D.N.J. 1975) at 6884-85 (granting employer-defendant's motion to dismiss: "In the
absence of any legislative history indicating a congressional intent to include transsexuals within the language of Title VII, the Court is reluctant to ascribe any import
to the term 'sex' other than its plain meaning."); Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457 (granting employer-defendant's motion to dismiss: "The legislative history of as well as
the case law interpreting Title VII nowhere indicate that 'sex' discrimination was
meant to embrace 'transsexual' discrimination, or any permutation or combination
thereof."). See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964) for extensive congressional discussion of the term "sex"

and 110 CONG. REc. 2804 for adoption of the amendment

adding "sex" to the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
41. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 750 ("We are not unmindful of the problem
Sommers faces."); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting); see also
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 477 (Iowa 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Sommers II. But see Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983).
42. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663; see also Sommers I, 337 N.W.2d at 477.
43. No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983).
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Board of Education (Grossman 1)," In re Grossman (Grossman I]),"3
and In re Grossman (Grossman 111),16 has established the employ-

ment context"7 basis for discrimination against a post-operative
transsexual. These cases raise several points of interest. First,
Grossman, a chromosomal and anatomical male at birth, was a maleto-female post-operative transsexual. Second, she was a public school

teacher. Third, Grossman's competence as a teacher was undisputed.
Fourth, and particularly significant, she was terminated for incapacity based on the belief of her employer that her sex-reassignment

could cause emotional harm to her students. This belief was found
44. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)

10,686 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd without publish-

ed opinion, 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976).
45. 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974), cert. denied, 321 A.2d 253 (1974).
46. 157 N.J. Super. 165, 384 A.2d 855 (1978).
47. One context of employment which seems inherently sensitive isthe military.
See, e.g., Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1981). There the court

recognized that the presence of a post-operative transsexual in the Army Reserve
could be disruptive to the mission of the organization and that, absent a constitutional claim, which was not raised, the defendants could refuse the transsexual plaintiff's application for admission. Id. at 904.
A similar rationale has been applied to the separation of homosexuals from
active service in the military. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied sub nom. Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), cert. denied sub nom.
Miller ,v. Weinberger, 454 U.S. 855 (1981). Responding to homosexual plaintiffappellants' constitutional claims and acknowledging the possibility of constitutional
protection for homosexuals, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless stated:
The nature of the employer-the Navy-is crucial to our decision. While
it is clear that one does not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon
entering the military, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights must be viewed in light of the special circumstances and needs
of the armed forces.
632 F.2d at 810. The court went on to state that "[riegulations which might infringe
constitutional rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because of military
necessities." Id. at 811. The court summarized its opinion as follows:
We are mindful that the rule discharging these plaintiffs is a harsh one
in their individual cases, but we cannot under the guise of due process give
our opinion on the fairness of every application of the military regulation.
It should be plain from our opinion that the constitutionality of the regulations stems from the needs of the military, the Navy in particular, and from
the unique accommodation between military demands and what might be
constitutionally protected activity in some other contexts.
Id. at 812.
Analogously, sexual conduct may be the basis for termination where there is
some reasonable/rational relationship between the sexual conduct and an anticipated
negative impact on job performance. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Major v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66 (D. La. 1976); Society for Individual
Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8934 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Mindel
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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to be reasonable."8 In this regard, it is to be noted that Grossman's
employer had offered to continue her employment at the high school
level. Grossman had been teaching ten- to twelve-year-old students.
The Grossman litigation seems to stand for several interrelated
propositions with respect to transsexuality. First, educational
employment-particularly, the teaching of pre-adolescent, intermediate
level students-is considered sensitive employment due to the
psychologically formative nature of such younger students. Regardless
of any protection which might be extended to transsexuals in other
employment settings, transsexuals in education probably will receive
a more qualified protection. In all likelihood, educational employers
would be among the few who could discriminate whenever transsexuality could be shown to bear a reasonable relationship to a defined
harm which it is legitimate for educational employers to seek to avoid.
Second, recalling that Grossman was offered a position at the high
school level, should statutory protection be extended to transsexuals,
educational employment would not appear to be a per se basis for
termination. Nonetheless, while not a per se basis, the educational
context of employment would remain a persuasive reason for the termination of transsexual teachers. Third, and perhaps most important,
where a transsexual teacher is terminated for incapacity due to his
or her transsexuality, and the transsexuality is deemed to preclude
virtually all future employment as a teacher rendering the individual
disabled in terms of an applicable pension plan, he or she may be
eligible to collect benefits from the plan."9
The Grossman line of cases illustrates the substantial impediment
posed by the context-of-employment argument for transsexuals seeking employment protection. But it is this same line of cases which
establishes precedent for considering transsexuality as a disability.
Transsexuals could utilize this precedential construction as an alternative argument for securing employment protection under those state
civil rights statutes extending such protection to persons who suffer
physical or mental handicaps. 5" Indeed, the leading case under state
law" asserted a disability claim as an alternative claim for relief under
the state civil rights statute.52
48. Grossman II, 127 N.J. Super. at 26-27, 316 A.2d at 45-46.
49. Id. at 27-34, 316 A.2d at 46-50. Compare Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d 470,
474-77 (Iowa 1983) where the supreme court discussed the meaning of "disability"
under the currently existing civil rights law of Iowa and explained why transsexuality
does not constitute a disability under the law.
50. See supra note 5.
51. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983).
52. Id. at 474; see supra note 5 for the text of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
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B. REMEDY SOUGHT UNDER STATE LAW: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACTS

The principal case involving a transsexual's attempt to secure
employment protection under a state's civil rights statute is Sommers
v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission (Sommers I]).53 Sommers, the plaintiff, had failed in a previous effort to secure protection under federal
law." She did not fare any better under the law of Iowa.
Sommers filed her initial complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission under section 601A.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act"
after being fired by her employer, Budget Marketing. Sommers had
worked only three days. The evidence showed that her termination
was due to her transsexuality. Budget Marketing did not assert any
6
dissatisfaction with Sommers' job performance.
The evidence further indicated that Sommers dressed as a female,
interviewed as a female, and was hired on the belief that she was
a female. Termination occurred when her employer learned that Sommers was an anatomical male. A principal concern of her employer
was Sommers' use of restroom facilities assigned to female employees.
This concern prompted her discharge."
The Iowa Civil Rights Commission, which enforces the state's
Civil Rights Act, held that it did not have jurisdiction over Sommers' claim.58 Because an agency's ruling that it does not have jurisdiction is final with respect to judicial review under Iowa law, 9 Sommers proceeded to file suit in state district court seeking review and
reversal of the commission's ruling. 0
The district court affirmed the commission's dismissal of Sommers' claim, again for want of jurisdiction under section 601A.6(1)(a).'
53. 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983).

54. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 748.
55. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(l)(a) (West 1975). See supra note 5 for the
text of this statute.
56. Sommers 11, 337 N.W.2d at 471.

57. Sommers I, 667 F.2d at 748-49; Sommers I, 337 N.W.2d at 471.
58. Sommers I, 337 N.W.2d at 471-72.
59. IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.19(1), (2) (West 1978 & Supp. 1983)); see also
id. § 601A.17(1) (West Supp. 1983) (stating that judicial review of actions by the
Iowa Civil Rights Commission may be sought pursuant to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act and may be brought in the district court in which an enforcement proceeding could be brought).
60. Chapter 17A of the Iowa Code contains the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 17A.19 provides that the exclusive avenue for review of decisions by the Iowa
Civil Rights Commission shall be the district court unless an alternative avenue is
expressly provided by another statute. IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A. 19 (West Supp. 1983).
61. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d at 472.
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The district court held that the commission properly interpreted the
operative language of the Civil Rights Act and was correct in ruling
that it lacked jurisdiction'over Sommers' initial complaint."2
Sommers followed with an appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa. 3
The supreme court sustained the rulings of the district court and the
Civil Rights Commission." The reasoning of the court parallels that
of the federal courts with regard to employment discrimination claims
brought by transsexuals under federal statutes.65 It found that Iowa's
legislature did not intend the term "sex," as used in section
601A.6(1)(a), to encompass transsexuality." For this reason, the
supreme court held that any remedy must be secured through legislative
extension of the coverage of the Civil Rights Act rather than through
judicial construction.6 ' The court further grounded its decision as to
the meaning of the term "sex" in the consistent rulings of the federal
courts with respect to complaints of transsexuals brought under the
8
Equal Employment Opportunity Act.6
Sommers, having failed on her claim of sex discrimination, filed
a second complaint with the commission alleging that her transsexuality
constituted a disability under section 601A.6(1)(a) of the Iowa Civil
Rights Act and that her termination constituted discrimination on the
basis of disability.6 9 The commission refused to consider this complaint as well."0 On Sommers' appeal, the district court sustained the
7
commission's ruling. '
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the disability claim. 2 The court held that the intent of the legislature
was to prohibit discrimination in employment against physically and
mentally handicapped persons whose specific handicapping conditions
would: 1) preclude most employment but not employment in a specific
62. Id. at 473.
63. Under Iowa law, a direct appeal to the state's supreme court is permitted
upon a final action by a district court. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.20 (West 1978).
64. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d at 470, 474 & 477.
65. Id. at 473-74; see supra text accompanying notes 26-42.
66. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d at 474.
67. Id.at 474, 477.
68. Id. at 474; see supra note 40.
69. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d at 472. See supra note 5; cf. Grossman III, 157

N.J. Super. at 169, 384 A.2d at 857 (holding that a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual public school teacher, discharged because of her sex-reassignment, was
"incapacitated" under the state law governing the pension fund for public school
teachers and was entitled to collect disability payments from the fund).
70. Sommers II, 337 N.W.2d at 472, 474.
71. Id. at 474.
72. Id.
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or narrow range of occupational positions;' 3 or 2) limit substantially
one or more major functions of life.7"
The supreme court held that Sommers' transsexuality did not constitute a disability on either of these grounds." According to the court,
transsexuality qua transsexuality does not limit the transsexual's capaci-

ty for employment. Further, the court noted that it does not impair
performance of major life-functions, " 'caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.' ....
The court noted that, while transsexuality could pose a barrier

to employment, it was a barrier related to societal attitudes and not
one related to transsexuality as a handicapping condition.77 And, once
again, the supreme court suggested that Sommers' remedy must come
through legislative inclusion rather than through judicial construction.

8

C. REMEDY SOUGHT UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866 AND 1871
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871,' 9 codified in part as
amended at 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983 and 1985(3), have been
73.. Id. at 476; see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(11) (West 1975).
74. Sommers I, 337 N.W.2d at 476.
75. Id.at 476-77.
76. Id. at 476 (quoting 240 IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 6.1(3) (1982)).
77. Sommers 11, 337 N.W.2d at 477.
78. Id. at 474, 477.
79. The text of these sections are as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
Every Person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the Untied States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. .

..

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
•..the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
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utilized by transsexuals as alternative grounds for relief from employment discrimination." As with actions brought under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, this route has proven ineffective.
Grossman I was the first attempt to secure this remedy. Grossman
asserted claims under sections 1981, 1983, and 1985(3). The federal
district court dismissed all three claims.8 As to the section 1981 claim,
the court noted that the intent of Congress as indicated by the phrase
''as is enjoyed by white citizens" was to afford protection to
black
citizens against the full spectrum of racial discrimination. The district
court held that Grossman had failed to state a claim for relief under
section 1981 so construed. 2 With respect to the claims alleged under
sections 1983 and 1985(3), the district court held that the defendant,
a board of education, was not a "person" as required by sections
1983 and 1985(3)." Consequently, these claims were dismissed for
failure to state claims within the purview of these statutes.8 4
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976).
The reader is advised that only § 1981 creates rights, the violation of which
can be asserted as a cause of action. Sections 1983 and 1985(3) create no rights;
rather they create causes of action.
A valid cause of action under § 1983 requires, directly or indirectly, some state
or local governmental action. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977).
With respect to § 1985(3), a valid cause of action alleging conspiracy to violate a
constitutional right requires that the plaintiff plead and prove state or local governmental action or an attempt to influence such action. See United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). It is to be noted that allegations of violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 can no longer be asserted in conjunction
with § 1985(3). See Great American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S.
366 (1979).
80. Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981);
Grossman , I I Empi. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
10,686 (D.N.J. 1975).
81. Grossman I, II Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,686; see supra note 79 for
the statutory language of §§ 1981, 1983 & 1985(3).
82. Grossman I, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
10,686 at 6883-84.
83. Id. at 6884. This construction of the term "person," at least with respect
to § 1983 actions, was based on the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). There the Court refused to recognize a § 1983 action against
a municipality, holding that a municipality was not a person for purposes of § 1983.
Id. at 187, 191. By implication, Monroe immunized school boards from suit under
§ 1983 because of the inextricable relationship between municipalities and school
boards. However, this construction of the term "person" under § 1983 is no longer
good law. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme
Court ruled that municipalities and school boards are "persons" under § 1983. Id.
at 690-91, 696-701. Whether or not Monell applies to the term "person" as used
in § 1985(3) is unclear.
84. Grossman , I I Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
10,686 at 6884.
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A claim for relief under section 1985(3) was pressed more recently
in Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.8" Kirkpatrick, a male-to-female
pre-operative transsexual, was discharged from her employment with

a beauty salon for wearing female attire as part of her preparation
for sex-reassignment surgery.", Her termination was handled by
representatives of her employer and the department store housing the
salon. Kirkpatrick filed suit alleging a conspiracy to deprive her of

her constitutional rights as a woman and as a transsexual.
The district court dismissed both claims brought under section
1985(3)." 7 The appellate court affirmed, without reaching the issue
of the application of section 1985(3) to transsexuals, holding that

Kirkpatrick had not alleged that she was terminated because of her
transsexuality and, hence, could not assert a claim of discrimination

based on transsexuality. Instead, the court found that Kirkpatrick had
alleged only that her employer would not permit her to wear female

aitire.88

D. USE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO SECURE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSSEXUALS

There has been virtually no recourse to due process or equal protection claims in the efforts of transsexuals to secure equal employment opportunity. Such claims have not been raised because most
employer-defendants are within the private sector.9" With the excep85. 636 F.2d 1047, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981).
86. Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d at 1048; see also Holloway v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369,
370 (D. Md. 1977). Living as a member of a pre-operative transsexual's psychological sex, the sex opposite the transsexual's chromosomal and anatomical sex, including dressing and grooming in the manner culturally appropriate for that sex,
is an element of the regimen prescribed during preparation for sex-reassignment
surgery. See supra note 9.
87. Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d at 1049. See supra note 79 for a discussion of the
requirements of a valid cause of action under § 1985(3).
88. Id. at 1050, 1051.
89. Contra Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663. There, the transsexual plaintiff-appellant,
Holloway, argued that Title VII must have been intended by Congress to encompass
transsexuals because their exclusion would render the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds. Therefore, asserted Holloway, Title
VII should be construed broadly in order to avoid questions of the statute's constitutionality. See supra notes 35 & 40, regarding intent of Congress, and accompanying text.
90. An action based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 or 1981 enables transsexuals to
seek redress against private employers. An action based on either the fifth or fourteenth amendments does not permit such redress unless'some connection indicative
of governmental action, federal, state or local, can be established.
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tion of the Grossman litigation, all employment discrimination suits
brought by transsexuals have been against such private sector
employers." At a minimum, fifth and fourteenth amendment claims

would require the plaintiff to establish either that the employer is

a public sector employer or that there exists a connection between

the employer and federal, state, or local government sufficient to meet
the requirement of governmental action under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Assuming the public nature of the employer, or that the

necessary connection with governmental action could be established,

it is likely that the employers could show a reasonable or rational

relationship between the discrimination and some legitimate interest
on the employer's part which might be secured through the
discriminatory action. 92
91. Kirkpatrick, 636 F.2d at 1047; Sommers , 667 F.2d at 748; Holloway, 566
F.2d at 659; Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I1l. Dec. 28, 1983); Powell, 436
F. Supp. at 369; Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 456.
92. The courts have developed two basic standards of review applicable when
plaintiffs allege violation of rights under the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The
more stringent of the two basic standards of review is strict scrutiny. It is applied
where a plaintiff asserts either an infringement of a fundamental right in violation
of substantive due process under the fifth or fourteenth amendments or discriminatory
treatment of a suspect or quasi-suspect class in violation of equal protection under
the fifth or fourteenth amendments. For a discussion of this stricter standard of
review, see generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, §§ 16-1 to -57.
The second basic standard of review is minimal scrutiny which applies when
a plaintiff asserts a substantive due process violation of a right not deemed
fundamental. For an articulation of this standard of review, see Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For examples of fundamental and non-fundamental rights, compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (right to welfare benefits not a fundamental right) with Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote is a fundamental right).
Under minimal scrutiny, the defendant is required to show that: (1) the end
sought by the governmental action is a legitimate and constitutional end, one which
is within the grant of police power and not precluded by any specific state or federal
constitutional provisions; and (2) the means chosen are related reasonably and/or
rationally to the end previously articulated. While the defendant is required to make
a showing, the burden of proof both in terms of production of evidence and persuasion is on the party asserting the constitutional violation. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537.
Minimal scrutiny is applied in the context of equal protection where: (1) the
plaintiff alleges discrimination in violation of the equal protection guarantee; but
(2) the discriminatory action is not directed towards a class deemed suspect or quasisuspect. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(classifications based on wealth do not create suspect or quasi-suspect classes). A
suspect or quasi-suspect class has been defined as a "discrete and insular minorit[y]."
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The courts have applied minimal scrutiny to the federal government as an
employer. For example, disqualifications for or terminations from federal employ-
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The consistent failure of transsexuals to secure equal employment
opportunity has not extended to other legal controversies centered on
their transsexual status. This has been true especially with respect to
the right to federal funding for the sex-reassignment surgeries of indigent transsexuals. The principal case in this area is Doe v. State
Department of Public Welfare93 decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota.
Doe was a male-to-female pre-operative transsexual who had
undergone all preliminary procedures necessary for sex-reassignment
surgery. 9 ' In addition, Doe had been certified as totally disabled on
psychological grounds which were linked to her transsexuality. Doe's
disabled status made her eligible for medical assistance benefits disbursed through the welfare department.95
Doe applied to the county for medical assistance to cover the
costs of her sex-reassignment surgery. 9 6 Doe's application was approved
ment based on sexual conduct, challenged on fifth amendment due process grounds,
have been evaluated only in terms of minimal scrutiny. See Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d
182 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (attempted termination for homosexual conduct); Mindel v.
United States Civil Serv., 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (attempted termination
for extramarital heterosexual activities); Major v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66 (D.
La. 1976) (attempted termination for extramarital heterosexual activities); Society for
8934 (N.D. Cal.
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
conduct).
homosexual
and
homosexual
being
for
1973) (attempted termination
Since it appears unlikely that the courts will soon recognize either a fundamental right in transsexuality, or accord transsexuals suspect or quasi-suspect class status,
no standard of review more stringent than minimal scrutiny is available at present
for transsexuals disqualified or terminated from employment in either the public or
government-related private sector. Unless: (a) transsexuality per se or access of transsexuals to equal employment opportunity are deemed among the fundamental substantive rights inherent in the liberty-interest protected by fifth or fourteenth amendment
due process (see Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808 (9th Cir. 1980)); or (b)
transsexuals are found to constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and the plaintiff
is a member of the class transsexuals, strict scrutiny would not be triggered. See
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663. Moreover, as the Grossman litigation indicates, even
a more stringent standard of review could be met by certain employers, e.g., public
10,686 (D.N.J.
and private schools. See Grossman I, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
1975); Grossman II, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974); Grossman III, 157
N.J. Super. 165, 384 A.2d 855 (1978).
93. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
94. Id. at 817.
95. Id. at 817-18.
96. Id. at 819. The medical benefits being sought by Doe by way of the county
welfare department were federal funds received by the state and disbursed by its
counties under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid), 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1976). Id.
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by the department's hearings officer.97 However, the county appealed
the decision of the hearings officer to the Department of Public
Welfare for the State of Minnesota. There the decision of the hearings officer was reversed. 98 Doe appealed that result to the district
court which affirmed the reversal issued by the Department of Public
Welfare.99 Doe followed with an appeal to the Supreme Court of Minnesota which reversed and remanded with an order to grant benefits
for Doe's sex-reassignment surgery.' 00
The supreme court, in reversing and remanding, noted that, when
a state receives federal funds, the state must administer those funds
in accordance with the applicable federal statute - in this case 42
U.S.C. § 1396 - and any federally issued rules and regulations promulgated to facilitate implementation of the statute.'"' The court
specifically pointed out that nothing in the applicable federal statutes
explicitly precludes coverage for sex-reassignment surgery.'10 Therefore,
the court held that the state's blanket prohibition of coverage for
sex-reassignment surgery was contrary to federal law.'0 3
The Minnesota Supreme Court then proceeded to address the question of whether or not benefits for sex-reassignment surgery should
be granted. The court ruled that the state must afford such an application "a thorough, complete, and unbiased medical evaluation...
to determine whether the requested surgery is 'medically necessary.'
The medical necessity of each applicant requesting funding for transsexual surgery must be considered individually, on a case-by-case
basis.' 04 With respect to medical necessity, the court struck down
the state's criterion, to wit, surgical benefits would be granted only

97. Id. at 817.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.at 821.
101. Id.at 819-20. The controlling statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976), Title XIX
of the Social Security Act (Medicaid) as supplemented by the following federal
regulation:
[TIhe State may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, or
scope of, such services to an otherwise eligible individual solely because of
the diagnosis, type of illness or condition. Appropriate limits may be placed
on services based on such criteria as medical necessity or those contained
in utilization or medical review procedures.
45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)(i)(1976).
102. Doe, 257 N.W.2d at 820.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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if the applicant could "prove that the surgery
would eliminate his
10 5
disability and render him self-supporting.
0 6 On appeal by the
Doe was followed in Pinneke v. Priesser.'
defendants, the appellate court upheld the ruling of the federal district
court which had granted a male-to-female post-operative transsexual
reimbursement from state-administered Medicaid funds for her sexreassignment surgery. The appellate court found that the decision denying funding for her surgery was an arbitrary violation of both governing federal law' 7 and federal regulations issued by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare0 8 to guide states in their implementation of the law.' 0 9
The question of federal funding of sex-reassignment surgery was
presented to the Fifth Circuit in Rush v. Parham"' with somewhat
different results. In Rush, the appellate court reversed the federal
district court's grant of summary judgment ordering the State of
Georgia's Medicaid program to fund a male-to-female pre-operative
transsexual's sex-reassignment surgery.
The appellate court held that summary judgment was improper
where facts are in dispute.' The central disputed fact in Pinneke
was the plaintiff's characterization of the surgery as necessary and
the defendant's characterization of the surgery as experimental.1' 2 The
appellate court held: (1) experimental surgeries are not fundable under
sections 1396(a) and 1396(d); and (2) the state's administrative agency
for Medicaid could review, on a case-by-case basis, medically made
decisions of necessity in determining whether or not funding is proper
under the applicable laws and regulations." 3 However, the appellate
court noted that the state could not deny funding for sex-reassignment
surgery solely because of the nature of the surgery or solely because
'4
of the condition to be corrected by sex-reassignment surgery.
These cases, though few in number, indicate that indigent transsexuals, both pre- and post-operative, must be accorded the same rights

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 820-21.
623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 547; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
Now, the Department of Health and Human Services.
Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549.
625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1154, 1157.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1154-55.
Id. at 1157 n.12.
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to benefits provided pursuant to the Medicaid program'" as would
any other covered person seeking benefits for more typical medical
of otherwise qualified indigent
problems. Arbitrary exclusion'
transsexuals from coverage will not be sanctioned by the courts.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF TRANSSEXUALITY

ON

MARRIAGE, CUSTODY, AND VISITATION
A.

MARRIAGE

It has been held, by those courts considering the question, that
pre-operative transsexuals do not have the right to marry." 7 The
reasoning is based on the legal definition of marriage. That definition requires that the parties be of opposite sex.'
B. v. B." 9 is authority for the proposition that the opposite-sex
status of a post-operative transsexual, attained prior to "marriage,"

will not be sufficient to render the post-operative transsexual a member
of the opposite sex for the purpose of marriage.' 20 In B. v. B., the
husband was a female-to-male post-operative transsexual at the time
he attempted to marry a chromosomally, anatomically, and
psychologically congruent female. The court took the position that
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
116. With respect to indigent transsexuals, arbitrary exclusion from coverage
means exclusion based solely upon: (a) transsexuality per se; or (b) the nature of
the medical assistance sought-sex-reassignment surgery.
117. See B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
118. See, e.g., Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d at 984-85, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (the
court, in holding that the marriage ceremony participated in by plaintiff-a
chromosomally, anatomically, and psychologically congruent male-and his male-tofemale pre-operative transsexual wife did not constitute a legal marriage, noted that
marriage is a status entered into by two persons of the opposite sex); B. v. B., 78
Misc. 2d at 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 716 (the court, in annulling a marriage between
a chromosomally, anatomically, and psychologically congruent female and a femaleto-male post-operative transsexual husband, defined marriage as "a contract between
a man and a woman"); see also Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311, 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (1971) (noting, in affirming the trial court's refusal to order issuance of
a marriage license to two homosexual males, that marriage is a "union between two
persons of the opposite sex"); Jones v. Hallaham, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973)
(defining marriage as "the union of a man and a woman"); Singer v. Hara, 11
Wash. App. 247, 253, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1974) (defining marriage as a relationship constituting "the legal union of one man and one woman").
119. 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); see also Anonymous,
67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
120. B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d at 118, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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the surgically created opposite-sex status of the husband did not render
him a member of the opposite sex for the purpose of marriage.
A dramatically different view was taken in the most recent case
to address marriage between a chromosomally, anatomically, and
psychologically congruent party and an opposite-sex post-operative
transsexual party. This case, M.T. v. J.T.,' 2 ' involved a chromosomally,
anatomically, and psychologically congruent male husband and a maleto-female post-operative transsexual wife. The parties were married
subsequent to the wife's sex-reassignment surgery. Some time after
the marriage, the post-operative transsexual wife filed an action for
support and maintenance against her husband. He responded with
an affirmative defense that the "marriage" of the parties was invalid
because of the wife's transsexuality.' 22
The trial court ruled for the transsexual wife, ordering the husband to support her. 23' On appeal by the husband, the appellate court
affirmed. 2 ' In doing so, the appellate court rejected the reasoning
of B. v. B. 125 However, the appellate court did accept the traditional,
customary, and legal definition of marriage as a relationship between
two parties of the opposite sex.' 26 The court further assumed that
a valid marriage requires sexually functioning partners.' 2' It treated
as irrelevant, however, the fact that the transsexual wife's sexual functioning was created surgically rather than having developed naturally
as a result of chromosomally directed sexual maturation. Since the
record established that the transsexual wife was female and able to
function sexually as a female,' 28 the appellate court held her to be
a female for the purposes of marriage. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellee
was able to enter into a valid marriage. That she did so would be
recognized by the law as would any marriage between two persons
of the opposite sex.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976).
Id. at 78-79, 355 A.2d at 205.
Id.
Id. at 90, 355 A.2d at 211.
See supra note 118 and cases cited therein.

126. 140 N.J. Super. at 82, 355 A.2d at 207-08; see supra note 118.

127. 140 N.J. Super. at 83-85, 355 A.2d at 209. While the court did focus on
the issue of sexually functional partners, it is to be noted that the variously formulated legal definitions of marriage do not rest upon the sexual functioning of
the partners. Indeed, such sexual functioning is not mentioned in the definitions of
marriage cited by the courts. See supra note 118.
128. See Jones, supra note 8, in TRANSSEXUALISM, supra note 6, at 316; see also
supra note 9 (concerning sexual functioning of transsexuals).
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B.

CUSTODY AND VISITATION

It is likely, given that pre-operative transsexuals are capable of
heterosexual relationships, that there are pre- and post-operative
transsexual parents. 2 ' The heterosexual relationships into which
children may be born may well terminate in divorce as the stress of
transsexuality overwhelms the coping capacity of the marital partners.
When this occurs, the inevitable questions and tensions involving
custody and visitation not only arise but become charged with an intense emotionality which often accompanies such a radical personal
redefinition as transsexuality - particularly, post-operative transsexuality. The only custody case involving a transsexual parent illustrates
this point.
This case, Christian v. Randall,,3 0 had its beginning in what appeared to be a routine marital dissolution action. Custody was awarded
to the wife. However, the wife was, in fact, a female-to-male preoperative transsexual who, some six years later, underwent sexreassignment surgery. As a result, the custodial parent had become
a female-to-male post-operative transsexual. Subsequently, he married a chromosomally, anatomically, and psychologically congruent
female. Together, they were raising the transsexual custodial parent's
four children from his prior marriage."13
The children's biological father filed a petition seeking custody
of all four children. 32' He alleged that the existing custodial arrangement was not in the best interests of the children because of the
custodial parent's female-to-male post-operative transsexuality.' 33
The district court, applying the "best-interests-of-the-child"
standard,' 3 found for the noncustodial parent. The court held that
129. This proposition is not to be construed as a conclusion based on
demographic data. The demographic data available pertaining solely to the class of

transsexuals is weak and in all likelihood underestimates the number of transsexuals.

See supra notes 8 & 9. In view of the fact that the data which would provide the
basis for such information as rates of marriage and divorce among transsexuals,
number of children, religious affiliation, occupation, etc., is insufficient, it is apparent that no safe demographic statement in support of this proposition can be
made. However, the proposition is offered in recognition of the experiential fact
that pre-operative transsexuals and post-operative transsexuals, prior to their sexreassignment surgeries, engage in heterosexual relationships-with or without benefit
of marriage-and, on occasion, do become parents as a result.
130. 33 Colo. App. 129, 516 P.2d 132 (1973).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 130, 516 P.2d at 133. The courts of Colorado, by statute, must
base custodial decisions on the best interests of the child. Thus:
(1) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
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the custodial parent's sex-reassignment surgery was such a significant
change in circumstances as to threaten the continued emotional development of the children. 35' Therefore, their best interests necessitated that
custody be transferred to the petitioning noncustodial parent.
The transsexual custodial parent appealed. The appellate court
reversed and ordered that custody remain with him.' 3 6 The appellate
court found no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the
sex-reassignment surgery was a change which negatively affected the
emotional well-being of the children. Finding that the sex-reassignment
surgery was a change which did not militate against the best interest
of the children, the court remanded with directions to deny the petition for custodial modification.' 3 7
Extrapolation from one appellate decision, given in a most sensitive
area, is ill-advised.' 38 This is especially true with respect to the perof the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall
consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parents as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(2) The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect his relationship to the child.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1973).
In ascertaining the best interests of the child, Colorado's courts treat parental
fitness as an element in the best-interests calculus. See, e.g., Munson v. Munson,
155 Colo. 427, 395 P.2d 103 (1964); Songster v. Songster, 150 Colo. 466, 374 P.2d
197 (1962). In turn, parental fitness is ascertained by examining such factors as:
(a) stability and continuity of the parental home; (b) the manner with which the parent
conducts himself or herself; (c) the parent's mental health; (d) the role of the parent
as the principal caretaker; (e) the parent's financial status. See generally M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY (1981); Delahoyde, Child Custody: Determining
the Best Interest of the Child, 7 J. Juv. L. 135 (1983).

It is important to note that, just as an estimation of parental fitness is a factor
in a court's initial custodial decision, any significant change in the parent's life may
force a reassessment of parental fitness. The court in Christian was faced with this
situation. 33 Colo. App. at 131, 516 P.2d at 133-34.
135. Christian, 33 Colo. App. at 132, 516 P.2d at 134.
136. Id. at 130, 516 P.2d at 132.
137. Id. at 134, 516 P.2d at 134-35.
138. The remainder of this section is suggestive of, rather than authoritative
on, the kinds of situations involving transsexual parents which could come before
the courts in the future. While these remarks utilize, by way of analogy, decisions
made with reference to homosexual parents, no other authority beyond Christian
can be cited to indicate more clearly how the courts will respond when faced with
any of the novel issues presented by transsexual parents seeking custody or visitation.
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mutations in the lifestyles of pre-operative transsexual parents. Courts
might interpret certain of these permutations as more threatening to
the best interests of children than others, awarding or altering custody
on the basis of such interpretations. For example, courts might be
more inclined to award or maintain the custody of a pre-operative
transsexual parent living as a member of his or her chromosomal,
anatomical sex than they would in the case of a pre-operative transsexual living as a member of his or her psychological sex. Or, courts
might be disposed to award or maintain the custody of a post-operative
transsexual, as in Christian, as opposed to a pre-operative transsexual
who, at the time of the custodial determination, is preparing actively
for sex-reassignment surgery. Or, again, courts may be more sympathetic to an acknowledged pre-operative transsexual than to one
who has kept his or her transsexuality secret during the divorce and
custody proceedings in order to enhance the possibility of a favorable
outcome, thereafter frankly announcing, by words or deeds, his or
her transsexuality. The contours of how the courts would rule in these
various hypothetical situations, and on what grounds, cannot be ascertained until more cases are heard-particularly in a cross-section of
jurisdictions..
It seems reasonable to expect, in view of Christian, that the interrelated standards of custodial determination'39 will be applied carefully
and on a case-by-case basis. Pre- and post-operative transsexuals may
or may not receive custody.'"" Just as the lifestyle of homosexuality
does not preclude custody, transsexuality per se will not preclude
custody.' 4 However, the courts may attach stipulations to the custody
139. The interrelated nature of the two standards employed in matters of custodial
determination are summarized succinctly in Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 410
N.E.2d 1207 (1980). There the appellate court explained:
[W]e believe that the critical question is whether the natural parents are
currently fit to further the welfare and best interests of the child. Neither
the "parental fitness" test nor the "best interests of the child" test is properly applied to the exclusion of the other .... [Tihe "best interests of the
child" test and the "unfitness of the parent" test "reflect different degrees
of emphasis on the same factors, that the tests are not separate and distinct
but cognate and connected."
Id. at 576-77, 410 N.E.2d at 1214-15 (footnote omitted).
140. Custody was awarded to the homosexual parent in Bezio, id.; M.P. v.S.P.,
169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979); and Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash.
2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978). Custody was awarded initially to the homosexual parent
but was terminated, on petition of the noncustodial, nonhomosexual parent, because
of the overt nature of the custodial parent's sexual relationship in the child's environment in M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
141. Christian, 33 Colo. App. 129, 526 P.2d 132 (1973).
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awarded to transsexual parents as they have to homosexual parents

in cases pertaining to both custody and visitation.'" Such stipula-

tions are likely especially where the custodial parent is a pre-operative
transsexual living in accordance with his (or her) chromosomal,
anatomical sex but residing with a person who is biologically of the
same chromosomal and anatomical sex as the transsexual. Such an
arrangement would have all the outward appearances of a homosexual
relationship. Consequently, the courts might respond as they have to
homosexual custodial parents: custody is allowed but only where the

homosexual relationship is maintained separate from the custodial
relationship. " 3 Where the issue is visitation by pre-operative transsexuals living as members of their psychological sex, the general rule

developed with respect to visitation for homosexual noncustodial

parents likely would be applied by the courts. Visitation would be

contingent on separating visits from any existing sexual relationships.""'
To date, however, no visitation cases involving pre- or post-operative

transsexual parents have been decided. So, at best, any predictions
as to the analyses and conclusions of the courts is speculative.
V.

SUMMARY

This comment has examined the rights of pre- and post-operative

transsexuals in three areas: equal employment opportunity, access to
federal funding for sex-reassignment surgery, and child custody and

142. See Irish v. Irish, 102 Mich. App. 75, 300 N.W.2d 739 (1980) (affirming
stipulation that the children of a female homosexual, noncustodial parent may not
remain overnight if the lover were to be present); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d
865 (Mo. App. 1982) (affirming modification of visitation order which required a
male homosexual, noncustodial parent to maintain complete separation between the
child and his homosexual friends and acquaintances and, also, prohibiting overnight
visits); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. App. 1982) (affirming modification of visitation order which required a female homosexual, noncustodial parent to maintain
complete separation between her children and her homosexual partner); Woodruff
v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979) (affirming the stipulation
that overnight visits of the son of a male homosexual, noncustodial parent be permitted only when the father's homosexual lover, friends, or acquaintances were absent); Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978) (affirming custodial award
to female homosexual parents but reversing the lower court's ruling that the female
homosexual parents could continue living in their open homosexual relationship).
143. Separating the homosexual from the custodial relationship means that the
children are not to be exposed to any overt manifestations of the homosexual relationship. Hence, there is to be no touching, kissing, or fondling. In addition, verbal
communication adverting to the relationship, e.g., words of endearment, are not permitted. See supra note 140.
144. See supra notes 140, 141.
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visitation. This survey of the relevant statutes and case law supports
the following conclusions.
Equal Employment Opportunity
Current case law, with the single exception of Ulane,"I indicates
that transsexuals, both pre- and post-operative, are not covered by
the protections afforded under either federal or state civil rights statutes
as presently written and construed by the courts. ' 6 Until federal or
state legislatures explicitly extend coverage to transsexuals,' 7 protec-

tion can be sought most fruitfully under Title VII, on the basis of
sex, where the term "sex" is given its common meaning. Hence, preoperative transsexuals would be required to allege and prove discrimina145. No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I1l. Dec. 28, 1983).
146. See supra notes 29 & 40.
147. Legislative action, despite Ulane, continues to stand as the principal effective route for securing equal employment opportunity because such action would
be a clear statement that the legislature wants transsexuals to receive such protection. The issues of intent and statutory construction would be laid to rest. While
Ulane is certainly a critical development, particularly if upheld on appeal, it would
be no more than a minority position finding protection under Title VII but opposed
by a well-established line of authority holding no protection under Title VII. See
supra notes 29 & 40. The result of Ulane may be more trials on Title VII claims
brought by transsexuals but not necessarily an established inclusion within the scope
of Title VII. Hence, the importance of legislation remains unaffected by Ulane. Only
affirmation of Ulane by the appellate court and, ultimately, by the Supreme Court
would diminish the importance of legislation in establishing equal employment opportunity for transsexuals.
Several options appear to be available to secure legislative extension of equal
employment protection to transsexuals at either the federal or state levels. First,
employment protection statutes currently in force could be amended to include, by
specific enumeration, transsexuality. Thus, for example, an equal employment statute
might read:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to exclude from employment,
to refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect
to any aspect of employment solely on the basis of race; color; ethnic or
national background; religious affiliation or conviction; age; mental or
physical disability, handicapping or limiting condition; sex; sexual preference;
or transsexual status.
A second alternative would be a statutory amendment which would extend equal
employment protection currently in force to all persons with a clear statement that
"all persons" means "all persons." See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (1961):
"No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right. . ." (including the right to equal employment opportunity). Or, transsexuals could push for
passage of a general civil rights statute encompassing a nondiscriminatory mandate
with respect to all civil, legal, and other rights and which explicitly extends such
a protective mandate to all persons.
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tion on the basis of chromosomal and anatomical sex rather than
psychological sex. Post-operative transsexuals would be required to
allege and prove discrimination based on the surgical convergence of
anatomical and psychological sex, urging the courts to disregard their
discrepant chromosomal sex." 8

Sex-reassignment Surgery
The decisions in this area indicate that indigent pre-operative
transsexuals have a right to federal funding for sex-reassignment

surgery. Post-operative transsexuals, indigent at the time of surgery,

have a right to reimbursement from federal funds. These rights are

contingent upon a medical determination that the surgery is necessary
as opposed to experimental or cosmetic."4 9 Hence, while coverage is

not provided automatically to indigent transsexuals for sex-reassignment
surgeries, coverage cannot be denied solely because of the transsexual
status of the applicant or solely because of the nature of the surgery.
Rights Respecting Child Custody and Visitation

The rights of pre- and post-operative transsexuals in this area

of law are nascent and not yet clearly discernible. -The holding in

Christian suggests that the post-operative transsexuality of a custodial
parent will not suffice to award custody to the noncustodial parent.

Whether or not permutations in lifestyle of pre-operative transsexuals will affect custodial awards is not known. Based on custodial

decisions involving homosexual parents, it would appear that the courts
will adopt a case-by-case approach, ' often awarding custody with
148. Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. I11.Dec. 28, 1983); see also Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977). The majority opinion
noted "consistent with the determination of this court, transsexuals claiming
discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would clearly state a cause of
action under Title VII." Id.
149. It is unclear how controlling a medical determination of necessity will be
in securing federal funding for sex-reassignment surgery. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Doe v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn.
1977), deemed the medical determination of necessity as controlling. However, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1155 (5th Cir.
1980), deemed equally controlling the administrative evaluation of the determination
of medical necessity.
150. A case-by-case approach, of course, is little different than the approach
taken in cases of heterosexual divorce. However, in heterosexual divorces, the sexual
lifestyles are considered normal, so the courts have little need to hedge their decisions regarding custody and visitation with stipulations intended to protect the children
from the sexual activities of their parents.
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stipulations
between the
sexuality. 1'
ual parents
fashion.

intended to provide physical and psychological distance
children and, at least, the sexual manifestations of transThe visitation rights of pre- and post-operative transsexlikely would be hedged with stipulations in a similar
VI.

CONCLUSION

Access by pre- and post-operative transsexuals to statutory rights,
for example, -equal employment opportunity, probably will require
legislative action explicitly adding pre- and post-operative transsexuals to the list of protected categories." ' Access by pre- and postoperative transsexuals to statutory rights enacted for the benefit of
all persons meeting stated criteria, for example, the standard of income necessary for inclusion in Medicaid, can be secured through
judicial construction of the applicable legislation and relevant administrative rules and regulations. The rights of pre- and post-operative
transsexual parents will be determined principally by the lower state
courts on a case-by-case assessment of the best interests of the children
involved.
L.
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151. See supra notes 142 & 143.
152. But see Ulane, No. 81C-4411, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1983); see supra
notes 29 & 147.

